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Abstract
Recent developments around the sharing economy bring to the fore questions of governability and broader societal benefit—
and subsequently the need to explore effective means of public governance, from nurturing, on the one hand, to restriction, 
on the other. As sharing is a predominately urban phenomenon in modern societies, cities around the globe have become 
both locus of action and central actor in the debates over the nature and organization of the sharing economy. However, cities 
vary substantially in the interpretation of potential opportunities and challenges, as well as in their governance responses. 
Building on a qualitative comparative analysis of 16 leading global cities, our findings reveal four framings of the sharing 
economy: ‘societal endangerment,’ ‘societal enhancement,’ ‘market disruption,’ and ‘ecological transition.’ Such framings 
go hand in hand with patterned governance responses: although there is considerable heterogeneity in the combination of 
public governance strategies, we find specific configurations of framings and public governance strategies. Our work reflects 
the political and ethical debates on various economic, social, and moral issues related to the sharing economy, and contrib-
utes to a better understanding of the field-level institutional arrangements—a prerequisite for examining moral behavior of 
sharing economy organizations.
Keywords Sharing economy · Public governance · Urban governance · Global cities · Governance strategies · Fuzzy-set 
qualitative comparative analysis (f-s QCA)
Introduction
There has been a lot of optimism for the transformative 
power of the sharing economy regarding a number of eco-
nomic, social, and environmental issues: a new ‘paradigm’ 
that uses resources more efficiently, creates new spaces 
for collaboration, has the “potential for greater equality” 
(McLaren and Agyeman 2015b, p. 3), and with a culture 
of ‘what’s mine is yours’ enables people to “become active 
citizens once again” (Botsman and Rogers 2011, p. xvi). 
Nonetheless, more recently, calls for regulating the sharing 
economy have become stronger (e.g., Calo and Rosenblat 
2017; Edelman and Geradin 2016), especially after negative 
newspaper coverage of incidents involving flagship sharing 
economy organizations. Much debated examples were, for 
instance, the surge pricing of Uber after a hostage crisis in 
Sydney’s CBD (e.g., Lapowski 2014; Vinik 2014), or the 
experience of the couple from Calgary who rented out their 
apartment via Airbnb to find it trashed after a “drug-induced 
orgy” (Yuhas 2015).
The current trend towards sharing has created novel chal-
lenges for societies. Sharing of resources regularly touches 
upon public interest and public goods as well as social 
impact (including, but not limited to, the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ which describes the problem of self-interested 
individuals exploiting shared resources [Hardin 1968; 
Ostrom 1990]), with important implications not only for 
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sharing economy organizations and their clientele but also 
for policy-makers and public sector actors. It brings to the 
fore questions about regulatory frameworks addressing (un-)
fair competition, tax regime/discipline, socio-ethical aspects 
such as labor standards in sharing economy organizations, 
and consumer protection, safety, and privacy (e.g., Ranzini 
et al. 2017; Lutz et al. 2017). These questions have made vis-
ible a number of governance gaps (Etter et al. 2017) and led 
to intense debates on the necessity of public intervention and 
suitable means to do so (e.g., Schor 2014; Morozov 2013; 
Mason 2015; McLaren and Agyeman 2015a; Sundararajan 
2016).
Cities around the globe have become both locus of action 
and central actor (Brandtner and Suárez 2017) in the debates 
over the nature and organization of the sharing economy 
(Kornberger et al. 2018). Modern forms of sharing are a 
deeply urban phenomenon as the vast majority of sharing 
economy services are offered in metropolitan areas. This 
makes city governments and governing authorities key play-
ers who need to actively and strategically engage with the 
sharing economy. City governments have to fulfill a bal-
ancing role in the face of multiple—sometimes irreconcil-
able—interests and claims. Governing the sharing economy 
confronts cities with moral dilemmas resulting from the fact 
that the idea of sharing challenges established economic and 
social structures as well as the stabilized constellation of 
vested interests. Public policies and governance strategies 
to address these moral dilemmas reflect the ethical position 
city governments take with regard to the sharing economy. 
Moreover, these policies and governance strategies shape the 
local, field-level institutional context in which other actors—
first and foremost sharing economy organizations and their 
clientele—engage with the sharing economy.
Still, what cities label as ‘sharing economy,’ and how 
they interpret the phenomenon and its ethical questions, 
differs considerably even within the same cultural setting 
(see, for example, Dupuis 2018 for a comparison of differ-
ent policy narratives around the sharing economy in the 
United States). Consequently, the assessments of potential 
opportunities and/or challenges of the sharing economy as 
well as appropriate governance responses equally vary. It 
is against this backdrop that our research is interested in 
the spectrum of interpretations (including their definitions, 
diagnoses of the situation, and the prospects with opportuni-
ties and challenges) that urban policy- and strategy-makers 
harbor with regard to the sharing economy and what kind 
of governance responses they consider appropriate. In par-
ticular, we aim at detecting specific configurations of inter-
pretative framings of the sharing economy and proposed 
public governance strategies. Empirically, we build on a 
comparative case study of 16 leading global cities and their 
positioning towards the sharing economy. We qualitatively 
analyze position papers (sometimes also labeled as ‘action 
plan,’ ‘development strategy,’ or ‘white paper’); we then use 
factor analysis (e.g., Lawley and Maxwell 1971) to identify 
framings, as well as fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analy-
sis (f-s QCA) methods (e.g., Ragin 2000, 2008; Schneider 
and Wagemann 2012) to identify the patterned relationship 
between these framings and public governance strategies.
Our empirical analyses reveal four framings of the shar-
ing economy—‘societal endangerment,’ ‘societal enhance-
ment,’ ‘market disruption,’ and ‘ecological transition’—and 
show that each of them is likely to be associated with a spe-
cific set of public governance strategies. Although there is 
considerable heterogeneity in cities’ combinations of public 
governance strategies, we are able to identify specific con-
figurations of framings and public governance strategies: 
‘societal endangerment’ is associated with ‘regulation,’ 
‘societal enhancement’ with ‘provision,’ ‘market disruption’ 
with ‘alignment,’ and ‘ecological transition’ with ‘informa-
tion’ strategies.
Our work is among the first to systematize the knowledge 
on opportunities and challenges that are attributed to the 
sharing economy in a transnational context, and highlights 
and reflects the political and ethical debates on the various 
economic, social, and moral issues related to governing the 
sharing economy. It focuses on the crucial role city gov-
ernments play in this respect—something that has hitherto 
received very little scholarly attention—and contributes to a 
better understanding of the field-level institutional arrange-
ments, which is prerequisite for the examination of moral 
behavior of sharing economy organizations.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: in 
the next section, we expand on the phenomenon and the 
conceptual orientation of our study. Subsequently, we out-
line sample, data, and methods before reporting our empiri-
cal results. We, then, discuss and theorize central findings 
derived from our empirical analyses. A concluding section 
highlights core contributions and limitations.
The Sharing Economy: Urban Phenomenon 
and Governance Issue
Sharing Economy as a Governance Concern
Policy-makers and public sector actors around the globe 
have been confronted with questions that accompany the 
emergence and unprecedented growth of the sharing econ-
omy; these questions entail governance concerns on multiple 
levels. For one, challenges arise as some business practices 
are so novel that the regulatory regimes in place do not fit 
(e.g., Biber et al. 2017; Cortez 2014). The production mode 
of co-creation and the blurring boundaries between produc-
ers, consumers, and employees often associated with shar-
ing organizations (e.g., Sundararajan 2016, 2017) make it 
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difficult for policy-makers to apply existing regulation (see, 
for instance, the debate whether providers of services, such 
as Uber drivers, are employees or not; e.g., Newlands et al. 
2017). Governance gaps also result from technological 
developments being ‘faster’ than regulation and enabling 
practices that were unanticipated by regulators (e.g., Zhou 
and Piramuthu 2013; Martin and Freeman 2004). Policy 
disruptions also arise due to the deliberate exploitation of 
‘ambiguous laws’ or ‘legal loopholes’ (Biber et al. 2017). In 
addition, governance gaps emerge due to the non-territorial 
nature of many sharing economy organizations (e.g., Ruggie 
2008 on governance gaps for transnational organizations). 
As Whelan et  al. highlight, multinational corporations’ 
(MNCs) rights and capacities “have far outpaced the con-
struction of regulative frameworks that might control them” 
(Whelan et al. 2009, p. 374), and the practices of MNCs such 
as Airbnb or Uber are “often not immediately subject to any 
sort of meaningful regulation or democratic legitimation” 
(Whelan 2017, p. 138).
However, on some occasion, existing regulations provide 
unintended obstacles for (social) innovations that could 
enhance or substitute established public goods or public 
services (for instance, urban gardening promises to fulfill 
a similar role as public parks), while for other innovations 
the impact on public service is yet unclear or contested (for 
instance, the effect of car sharing on public transportation). 
Existing regulation reflects the views of the regulating body 
at the time the regulation was written (Biber et al. 2017) and 
the high speed of emergence and adaption of new business 
models as well as the varied nature of these models renders 
it very difficult for policy-makers to address the phenomenon 
in a comprehensive way.
The governance issues debated comprise property rights, 
employment relationships, data privacy and security, com-
plemented by safety and health, licensing, and taxation 
(European Commission 2016; Thorne and Quinn 2017). 
Consequently, the sharing economy touches upon multiple 
policy fields and areas of law, such as labor, ownership, 
consumer protection, data protection, liability and insur-
ance, trade, competition and antitrust, anti-discrimination, 
and taxation. Depending on the specific area of operation, 
sharing economy services might have to consider a number 
of additional legal regulations (for instance, the food and 
hygiene code in the case of food sharing; the transportation 
code in the case of car sharing; or the planning and build-
ing code in the case of home sharing). Besides the question 
of scope and applicability of existing regulation, govern-
ing authorities are confronted with the complex task of law 
enforcement (for instance, the local-level collection of taxes 
from global providers and platform operators; see also Kou-
rula et al. 2019).
Issues of governance go hand in hand with a debate 
whether all that is commonly labeled as ‘sharing economy’ 
can be subsumed and theorized under one concept. Eckhardt 
and Bardhi (2015) conclude that “the sharing economy isn’t 
about sharing at all.” Others advocate more fine-grained 
definitions. Belk (2014, p. 7), for instance, distinguishes 
“true sharing” from “commodity exchanges wrapped in a 
vocabulary of sharing.” This so-called ‘pseudo-sharing’ can 
be distinguished, according to Belk, by for-profit orienta-
tion, expected reciprocity, and the absence of feelings of 
community. Consequently, the most prominent examples 
of the sharing economy such as Airbnb or Uber would not 
count as ‘true sharing.’ In a similar vein, Dobusch (2016) 
discusses two facets of the sharing economy (a commons-
based vs. a market-based sharing economy) but argues that 
the main differentiation does not lie so much in practices 
but in the organization of sharing: In a market-based shar-
ing economy the direct reciprocal exchange is mediated by 
a platform, whereas in a commons-based sharing economy 
private property and forms of personal coordination are 
employed. Other scholars, such as Bucher et al. (2016), 
analyze people’s motives for participating in practices of 
sharing. They find that—even in platform-mediated forms of 
sharing—moral motivations are the second strongest deter-
minant of sharing attitudes (after social-hedonistic motives 
but trumping monetary motivation). Etzioni (2017) points 
at the interesting and growing discrepancy between trusting 
strangers in cyberspace and distrusting offline institutions. 
By assessing networks of attributes that describe different 
business models within the sharing economy, Oberg et al. 
(2016) identify three distinct types: ‘traditional sharing,’ 
‘grassroots sharing,’ and ‘platform sharing.’ While in tra-
ditional sharing employees still produce the central value, 
in grassroots sharing the value is created by volunteering 
of community members; platform sharing, then, separates 
the service delivery (mainly by community members) from 
the intermediation and community management (mainly by 
employees).
Not surprisingly, the implications of the sharing econ-
omy are discussed and assessed rather differently as well. 
Some scholars highlight the opportunities: Schor (2014), for 
instance, regards sharing as an intermediate stage to a fairer 
and more people-centered economy, and Mason (2015) 
even diagnoses an ‘end of capitalism’ that is to be followed 
by a transition to a better society. Others, to the contrary, 
regard the sharing economy as a step to a more dehuman-
ized economy. Morozov (2013), for instance, describes the 
sharing economy as ‘neoliberalism on steroids’ and calls 
Silicon Valley billionaires its main beneficiaries. Moore and 
Robinson (2016), with a focus on flexible workplaces which 
are typical for the gig economy, stress that the working con-
ditions that go along with these new business models rely 
on ‘cold’ quantification and will consequently lead to more 
precariousness and intensified competition. Whelan (2018) 
emphasizes how the rise of online (sharing) platforms 
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entails intense digital surveillance and infringes the privacy 
of users; Martin (2018) attests an erosion of the ‘norms of 
exchange’ that can also harm trust in established institutions. 
For specific sharing services, the potential external effects 
and trade-offs are debated. For instance, while tourists and 
local ‘micro-preneurs’ may benefit from home sharing, it 
leads, at the same time, to significant pressure on prices 
on the housing market (e.g., Lee 2016). Codagnone et al. 
(2016) grouped and categorized existing narratives on the 
sharing economy, which display different possible paths for 
its evolution: great transformation, regulated sustainability, 
growth-oriented globalization, and barbarization. Additional 
attempts to systematize different perspectives on the shar-
ing economy have been pursued by Gruszka (2017) who 
analyzed sharing economy activists and Martin (2016) who 
assessed the social media and online discourse surrounding 
the sharing economy.
Sharing Economy as an Urban Phenomenon Evoking 
Ethical Tensions and Moral Dilemmas
Different from its more traditional variants, such as agricul-
tural cooperatives (e.g., Becker and Mosmann 2017), con-
temporary sharing is predominately an urban phenomenon 
(Davidson and Infranca 2016). With this, cities and metro-
politan areas have become a central arena in which issues 
concerning the sharing economy are debated, negotiated, 
and addressed. City governments face manifold challenges, 
which are only partially covered by national regulation (e.g., 
Mazzucotelli Salice and Pais 2017). The majority of govern-
ance issues surface on the urban level and regulatory author-
ity regarding these issues is often fragmented and unclear 
(e.g., Katz 2015). In addition, a lack of knowledge and expe-
rience on the side of governing authorities has been attested 
(e.g., Cohen 2016; Gori et al. 2015).
The multifaceted nature of what is generally subsumed 
under ‘sharing’ and the divergent set of vested interests fuel 
the governance challenges on the urban level as cities are 
confronted with moral dilemmas. These dilemmas result 
from the fact that the idea of sharing challenges established 
economic and social structures. First of all, the notion of 
‘sharing’ itself contains a moral connotation of being supe-
rior to traditional ownership-oriented forms of economy 
(Belk 2007, 2010; Gudeman 2001). Kornberger et al. (2018) 
go a step further in characterizing the sharing economy as 
a ‘balancing act’ involving social, economic, and moral 
concerns: As a novel form of collective action, the authors 
argue, what enables and holds together all instances of shar-
ing is a shared moral concern. Second, resources are limited 
and individual as well as collective actors are committed to 
different values. This leads to a clash of conflicting interests 
and priorities in the urban space where the sharing economy 
primarily unfolds.
Cities face considerable moral dilemmas in policy-mak-
ing because they need to balance these interests and priori-
ties. This results in ethical questions of what “governments 
ought to do or ought not to do” (Boston et al. 2010, p. 1). 
Hence, it becomes clear that governing the sharing econ-
omy has an inherently politico-ethical dimension (see also 
Kornberger et al. 2018). Yet, as Jonsen and Butler (1975, p. 
19) note, “those concerned with policy making—the politi-
cians, the bureaucrats and the technicians—generally avoid 
discussing ethics. […] [Ethics] seems out of place in their 
world of constituencies, interest groups, power blocs, insist-
ent demand, and limited resources.” However, regardless of 
whether addressed explicitly or not, any policy choice goes 
hand in hand with conscious or unconscious ethical consid-
erations and decisions as they affect social arrangements 
and comprise moral trade-offs (Jonsen and Butler 1975). 
Public policies and governance strategies therefore reflect 
the ethical position city governments take with regard to the 
sharing economy.
Cities as Strategic Actors: Issue Framing 
and Governance Response Strategies
All this makes city governments and governing authorities 
key players who (need to) actively and strategically engage 
in the debate and praxis of the sharing economy. In some 
instances, they are called to action by particular stakehold-
ers; in other instances, they proactively engage in the ‘poli-
tics of signification’ (Hall 1982) of new urban topics very 
early on. ‘Strategic city actorhood,’ according to Brandt-
ner and Suárez (2017), means that governing authorities 
of metropolises consciously and often strategically engage 
rather than simply react to demands from constituencies. 
City administrations commonly address complex issues by 
crafting strategy documents or position papers that are acts 
of ‘performative communication’ (Christensen et al. 2013) 
and prescribe the aspired governance approach (Brandtner 
et al. 2017). Kornberger and Clegg (2011) emphasize that, 
besides socially negotiated meanings, such strategy also 
communicates who has voice and legitimate and illegitimate 
forms of action.
With a diversity of manifestations and forms, unclear 
boundaries, and unknown implications, the sharing economy 
makes strategizing more complex than issues that can be eas-
ily assigned to a specific policy field. The interpretation of 
what is part of the sharing economy and what is not as well 
as the opportunities and challenges that come with it—i.e., 
the way they frame “what is at issue” (Gamson and Modigli-
ani 1989, p. 3)—are central ‘ingredients’ for how city gov-
ernments approach the phenomenon and which governance 
solutions they craft. Frames are schemata of interpretation 
(Goffman 1986); they “locate, perceive, identify and label 
occurrences within their life space and the world at large” 
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(Snow et al. 1986, p. 464). Framing not only diagnoses what 
is a problem; it also contains moral and ethical positions and 
suggests possible solutions (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow 
and Benford 1988). The role of framing and strategic action 
in policy debates is illustrated, for example, by Hoffman and 
Ventresca (1999) with regard to environmental policies in 
general, or by Lefsrud and Meyer (2012) concerning climate 
change, more specifically.
On a practical level, city governments have available 
a set of policy instruments that they may choose from in 
order to steer society (e.g., Pierre and Peters 2000; Le Galès 
2010)—in our case, to respond to and govern the sharing 
economy. With regard to the available tool box, Bemelmans-
Videc et al. (1997) distinguish between economic, legal, or 
informational policy instruments. Simplified, they refer 
to ‘carrots’ in terms of incentives for appropriate behav-
ior, ‘sticks’ as punishment (based on laws and regulations) 
for unwanted behavior, and ‘sermons’ in order to influence 
the debate and public opinion. The actual choice of policy 
instruments reflects the cities’ framing of the phenomenon 
(Houle and Macdonald 2011).
Yet, we currently know little about the way in which 
‘policy problems’ and ‘policy tools’ are matched by govern-
ing authorities with regard to the sharing economy. Hence, 
our study conceptually and empirically engages with which 
framings and related opportunities and challenges of the 
sharing economy city authorities draw on, and which com-
bination of governance strategies they apply. We aim at pat-
terned governance responses, that is, specific configurations 
of framings and public governance strategies. Moreover, we 
argue that policies and governance strategies will shape the 
field-level institutional context for sharing economy organi-
zations and their clientele.
Data and Method
Sampling and Data Sources
Following Brandtner et al. (2017), we consider government-
issued strategy documents to be appropriate for studying 
governance concerns. For our context, in addition to strategy 
documents focusing on the sharing economy, we argue that 
position papers and information websites published by gov-
erning authorities are equally well suited to analyze cities’ 
interpretations of the sharing economy and to extract the 
governance strategies they regard as an adequate response. 
These documents are usually created in a broader process, 
have to pass defined release procedures, and are therefore 
formal statements of public sector officials on behalf of the 
city government or municipal agency. They are means of 
self-positioning and often serve as a compass and guiding 
orientation given a still rather vague phenomenon (Brandtner 
et al. 2017). In these texts, governments combine their diag-
nosis and prognosis of the issue with a proposed course of 
actions. As we regard them as self-contained and useful 
snapshots of the cities’ position, the strategy documents 
and position papers themselves serve as our unit of analysis.
We opted for a comparative research design encompass-
ing 16 leading global cities (see Table 1 for details). Our 
sample is based on A. T. Kearney’s (2017) Global Cities 
Index.1 We included all cities from the index that have so 
far issued one or several official documents on the sharing 
economy or a more comprehensive strategy document (such 
as a city development plan) with a specific section devoted 
to the sharing economy. For the selection of our cases and 
discursive material, we applied a broad working definition 
of ‘sharing’ and ‘sharing economy.’ Following Botsman 
and Rogers (2010, p. 30; these authors also coined the term 
‘collaborative consumption’), we were interested in cities’ 
perspectives and standpoints towards “systems of organ-
ized sharing, bartering, lending, trading, renting, gifting, 
and swapping,” including sharing practices among people 
but also (platform) organizations providing or facilitating 
these practices. In addition, Bucher et al. (2016) provide an 
excellent overview on definitions of the sharing phenomena 
in academic research which also comprises a list of spe-
cific examples (e.g., carpooling, couchsurfing, sharing of 
communally owned goods, borrowing and lending items of 
everyday life) that helped to delimit the phenomenon. 13 of 
the 16 selected cities are ranked in the top 25 of the Global 
Cities Index 2017; the remaining 3 are ranked between 26 
and 50 and are all included in the Global Cities Outlook 
2017 which evaluates a city’s potential to become one of the 
world’s most prominent cities.
Method of Data Generation
We analyzed and coded our sampled documents with regard 
to (a) perceived opportunities and/or challenges and (b) the 
public governance strategies that are proposed in response 
(for an overview, see Table 2). The coding categories we 
used are based on insights from a qualitative pilot study in 
which we compared the position papers of a limited sample 
using qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2014) in order 
to inductively develop a comprehensive coding scheme. 
Interestingly, the categories for framing the sharing econ-
omy as either opportunity or challenge broadly resemble 
the triple bottom-line framework (Elkington 1997) of social, 
economic, and environmental aspects frequently used in 
discussions of sustainability and social responsibility. The 
1 The Global Cities Index is published annually and ranks the most 
influential cities worldwide according to their performance on five 
dimensions: business activity, human capital, information exchange, 
cultural experience, and political engagement (A. T. Kearney 2017).
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categories for public governance strategies encompass the 
well-known policy instruments ‘promotion,’ ‘regulation,’ 
and ‘information’ (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 1997) as well as 
‘partnering’ (see also Steurer 2010), but also contain addi-
tional ones such as ‘alignment,’ ‘expert knowledge,’ ‘tech-
nology,’ and ‘provision.’
We coded each text according to the above-mentioned 
categories using fuzzy-set scales; multiple categories per 
text were permitted. According to Ragin (2007), fuzzy-set 
scales provide a middle way between quantitative and quali-
tative measurement by indicating a degree of membership in 
a focal category. We used six qualitative measures to assess 
Table 1  Sample of cities
a These are our main data sources which we coded in detail and used for the subsequent analyses. We investigated additional information pro-
vided on the websites of governing authorities and press releases for sensitizing of the coding and for a better contextualization of the statements 
in our main sources
b Rank according to the A. T. Kearney Global Cities Index 2017
c The document ‘The Collaborative Economy in NSW’ technically is not issued by the City of Sydney but by the New South Wales Government, 
covering, however, much of the greater Sydney metropolitan area
City Position paper or information website on the sharing  economya GCIb
New York City ‘NYC reuse sector report’ (New York City 2017) 1
London ‘London: The circular economy capital’ (London Waste & Recycling Board 2015) 2
Paris ‘White paper on the circular economy of Greater Paris’ (Mairie de Paris 2015) 3
Hong Kong ‘Regulation of sharing economy platforms involving illegal commercial activities’ (Government of Hong Kong 2017) 5
Chicago ‘House-sharing reforms and protections’ (City of Chicago 2016) 7
Los Angeles ‘Sustainable city plan’ (City of Los Angeles 2015) 8
Seoul ‘Sharing city, Seoul’ (Seoul Metropolitan Government 2014) 12
Berlin ‘Von der geteilten zur teilenden Stadt’ (Berlin Projekt Zukunft 2016) 14
Toronto ‘The sharing economy’ (City of Toronto 2017) 16
Sydney ‘Share Sydney’ (City of Sydney 2013); ‘The Collaborative Economy in NSW’ (NSW Government 2015)c 17
Vienna ‘Wir machen in Wien die Share zur Fair Economy’ (Stadt Wien 2016) 20
Amsterdam ‘Action plan sharing economy’ (City of Amsterdam 2016) 22
Barcelona ‘The impetus plan for the social and solidarity economy’ (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2016) 24
Vancouver ‘Greenest city—2020 Action Plan’ (City of Vancouver 2015); ‘Zero Waste 2040’ (City of Vancouver 2016) 35
Copenhagen ‘Regional growth and development strategy’ (Greater Copenhagen 2017) 42
Milan ‘Milano sharing city’ (Comune di Milano 2014) 43
Table 2  Coding scheme for opportunities, challenges, and public governance strategies with regard to the sharing economy
 Opportunities Challenges
• Public opportunities, such as
   − Macro-economic growth and job creation
   − Social and societal improvements
• Market opportunities, such as
   − Economic diversity, new business  
models, and innovation
   − Increased consumer choice
• Environmental opportunities, such as
   − Conserving natural resources
   − Reducing emissions
• Public challenges, such as
   − Safeguarding public interest and stability
   − Employee protection and social security
• Market challenges, such as
   − Protection of existing companies and market 
participants
   − Consumer protection and issues of safety
• Environmental challenges, such as
   − Additional resource usage
   − Rebound effects
Public governance strategies
• Promotion and funding of desired initiatives (‘promotion’)
• Regulation by creating and enforcing laws (‘regulation’)
• Information and involvement of citizens (‘information’)
• Alignment and exchange with other governments (‘alignment’)
• Expert knowledge and workgroups (‘expertise’)
• Technology as governance mechanism (‘technology’)
• Partnering with sharing economy organizations (‘partnering’)
• Provision of sharing services by the government (‘provision’)
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set membership: in the target set (1.0); mostly but not fully 
in the target set (0.8); more in than out of the target set (0.6); 
more out than in the target set (0.4); mostly but not fully out 
of the target set (0.2); and out of the target set (0.0). For each 
of these scores, we defined clear indicators in the coding 
guidelines. Two members of the research team coded the 
entire dataset independently; all cases of disagreement were 
discussed and subsequently resolved.
Methods of Data Analysis
We applied factor analysis to identify cities’ interpretative 
framings of the sharing economy within a strategy document 
or position paper. We made use of the maximum-likelihood 
factor analysis routine provided by the ‘R’ software suite 
(e.g., Lawley and Maxwell 1971). This procedure helped 
us to condense the various opportunities and challenges 
into four central framings that are employed throughout our 
empirical material.
For the following steps, we applied fuzzy-set qualitative 
comparative analysis (f-s QCA; e.g., Ragin 2000, 2008; Sch-
neider and Wagemann 2012). The set coincidence analysis 
for the eight strategies (see Table 2) confirmed their inde-
pendence (see “Appendix A”). Therefore, all eight strate-
gies were included in the subsequent analyses. Patterns of 
governance responses were identified by analyzing the co-
occurrence of responses across the cases. We, then, brought 
together interpretative framings and proposed public gov-
ernance strategies in order to find specific configurations of 
framings and governance strategies.
Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (f-s QCA) ena-
bles the systematic comparison of multiple cases in complex 
situations by investigating similarities and differences across 
these cases. QCA is both a research approach and a set of 
tools and techniques (Rihoux and Lobe 2015). The method is 
well suited to detect and break-down complex relationships 
as it facilitates the identification of recurring patterns and 
alternative pathways that lead to the same outcome (Fiss 
2007).
QCA can be used in situations where there are too few 
cases to apply conventional statistical tools by combining 
elements of qualitative and quantitative analysis (e.g., Ragin 
2000). It differs from conventional statistical methods as it 
is based on Boolean algebra and on the idea that relational 
conditions can be understood in terms of set-theoretic rela-
tions rather than correlations (Ragin 1987, 2000). The focus 
on set-theoretic relations in QCA allows addressing ques-
tions of necessity and sufficiency separately, and, at its core, 
of ‘equifinality’—different configurations that result in the 
same observed outcome. QCA is an iterative process, involv-
ing rounds of within-case analysis and cross-case compar-
isons as well as inductive and deductive logics of theory 
development (for a fine-grained f-s QCA application in the 
field of CSR, see Halme et al. 2018). The rigorous process 
and the different proven tools help to make analyses more 
reliable and comprehensible (e.g., Scholz et al. 2016).
There are examples of studies combing QCA with a num-
ber of other methods for the discovery of structural similar-
ity and difference. For instance, Haynes (2014) and Hotho 
(2014) combine cluster analysis with QCA; yet they do not 
use the output of one method as the input for the other, but 
rather process and compare the same data twice with differ-
ent methods in order to check for reliability. In our study, we 
use the key factors identified through factor analysis as a var-
iable for QCA. It is important, however, to note that—based 
on the data we use in this study—we did not assume that 
these factors—which stand for different diagnostic and prog-
nostic framings of the sharing economy—can be causally 
related to cities’ governance responses. Rather, we assume 
that in practice both, interpretations of the sharing economy 
and public governance strategies, are the result of in-depth 
considerations prior and during the production of the strat-
egy documents and position papers and mutually influence 
each other. Therefore, the QCA distinction of ‘causal condi-
tion’ (~independent variable) and ‘outcome’ (~dependent 
variable) is for mathematical reasons and we will interpret 
our configurations as co-occurrence rather than as causality. 
We calculated consistency and coverage values according to 
Ragin (2008) and applied the Quine–McCluskey minimiza-
tion technique using the software suite fsqca 3.0.
Empirical Results
Framing the Sharing Economy in Terms 
of Opportunities and Challenges
Our analysis, in a first step, yields results for the co-occur-
rence of perceived opportunities and challenges within 
cities’ interpretations of the sharing economy. By running 
several factor analyses for a varying number of factors we 
were able to isolate and capture two key factors that explain 
such co-occurrence. Table 3 shows the detailed results of the 
two-factor analysis that we opted for.2
To capture the meaning of the two factors, we looked 
closely at all variables with a loading value above 0.3 or 
below − 0.3. Each factor can be interpreted in two ways 
(i.e., also including its inversion), resulting in four central 
framings of the sharing economy in terms of opportunities 
and challenges.
Factor 1 captures public challenges (i.e., safeguarding 
public interest and stability, employee protection, and social 
2 ‘Environmental challenges’ were not included in the factor analysis 
due to their extremely low occurrence across the sample.
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security) and market challenges (i.e., protection of existing 
companies and market participants, as well as consumer pro-
tection and issues of safety). In addition, factor 1 reflects the 
absence of public and environmental opportunities. There-
fore, factor 1 can be interpreted a city’s awareness of ‘societal 
endangerment.’ The inversion of factor 1 aggregates public 
opportunities (i.e., macro-economic growth and job crea-
tion as well as social and societal improvements) and—to a 
lesser extent—environmental opportunities (i.e., conserving 
natural resources and reducing emissions). It further reflects 
the significant absence of public and market challenges. The 
inversion of factor 1 can be interpreted as a city’s belief in the 
potential of the sharing economy for ‘societal enhancement.’ 
Overall, factor 1 indicates a general assessment of the phe-
nomenon stressing a social/societal dimension.
Factor 2 captures market opportunities (i.e., economic 
diversity, new business models, and innovation as well as 
increased consumer choice) and, most interestingly, also 
market challenges (i.e., protection of existing companies 
and market participants, as well as consumer protection and 
issues of safety). In addition, it integrates the absence of envi-
ronmental opportunities. We therefore interpret factor 2 as a 
city’s assessment of the potential of the sharing economy in 
terms of ‘market disruption.’ The inversion of factor 2, then, 
reflects environmental opportunities (i.e., conserving natural 
resources and reducing emissions). It further captures the 
absence of market opportunities and challenges. Hence, the 
inversion of factor 2 can be interpreted as a city’s belief in 
the sharing economy as an opportunity for ‘ecological transi-
tion.’ Overall, factor 2 indicates a general assessment of the 
phenomenon juxtaposing economic and ecological issues.
Figure 1 displays the two factors that emerge from cities’ 
discursive engagement with the sharing economy. On the 
x-axis we see ‘societal endangerment’ and ‘societal enhance-
ment’ as opposites. On the y-axis, ‘market disruption’ (i.e., 
Table 3  Two-factor analysis for opportunities and challenges
Factor 1 Factor 2
Public opportunities − 0.629 0.113
Market opportunities − 0.057 0.996
Environmental opportunities − 0.320 − 0.505
Public challenges 0.908 0.272
Market challenges 0.789 0.385
Fig. 1  Framing the sharing 
economy
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including both economic opportunities and challenges) is 
placed against ‘ecological transition.’ In Fig. 1, all cities of 
our sample are plotted according to the way in which they 
score on these two factors in their strategy documents.
To illustrate how these divergent framings of the shar-
ing economy are combined in the cities’ strategy docu-
ments and position papers, we provide two vignettes. The 
City of Amsterdam (2016) describes the sharing economy 
as follows:
“Under the banner of the sharing economy, the Col-
lege [of Mayor and Alderpersons] sees new companies 
emerge that provide for an acceleration of innovations 
regarding goods and services, which often provide 
easier and cheaper access to goods and services for 
the consumer. […] This can add to the diversity of sup-
ply, which is good for the market. It remains a task for 
the government to preserve this fair and level playing 
field. […] In the face of rapidly growing companies, it 
is an important duty of the government to prevent the 
emergence of monopolies and cartels. […] The tradi-
tional labour model, in which people are employed by 
an organisation or earn standard hourly wages, often 
does not apply when working for or via a sharing plat-
form. […] This is clearly relevant to the matter of pro-
tecting social security and labour rights.”
The Amsterdam statement draws on a (positive) ‘market dis-
ruption’ framing and a ‘societal endangerment’ framing. In 
contrast, the Mayor of Paris (Mairie de Paris 2015) who uses 
the term circular economy draws on an ‘ecological transi-
tion’ and a ‘societal enhancement’ framing:
“The purpose of the circular economy is to end 
the uncoupling that has occurred between growth 
and environmental protection, between goods and 
resources and between exchange values and values 
in use. By substituting a logic that favors reuse over 
replacement, this economy allows each individual to 
renew, in the broadest sense, those fragile links with 
his or her environment without which any wealth 
creation must entail a depletion of resources. […] It 
is an economy that encourages new forms of produc-
tion and consumption, as well as sociability, sharing 
and democracy, as opposed to a short-term profit and 
consumerist diktat. It also holds the promise of new 
business sectors with strong regional roots and quality 
jobs that will not be relocated.”
Public Governance Strategies in Response 
to the Sharing Economy
In order to assess the association of framings and public 
governance strategies, we conducted an analysis of what is 
technically referred to as ‘necessary’ or ‘sufficient’ condi-
tions.3 Table 4 shows the results of this analysis.
High consistency with necessity (cn) for the presence of 
a strategy—i.e., cn-scores for presence above 0.8—indi-
cates that a focal strategy is very likely to appear with a 
particular framing; cn-scores between 0.7 and 0.8 highlight 
potentially necessary strategies. The same applies to the 
interpretation of the cn-scores for the absence of a strategy. 
We find, for instance, that cities which strongly rely on a 
‘societal endangerment’ framing are very likely to apply the 
governance strategy ‘regulation by creating and enforcing 
laws’ (cn = 0.91 for presence). Our results also show that 
the same cities are very likely not to refer to ‘provision of 
government sharing services’ (cn = 0.86 for absence) in their 
position papers. In contrast, cities that strongly rely on a 
‘societal enhancement’ framing are very likely referring to 
‘promotion and funding of desired initiatives’ (cn = 0.81 for 
presence). Consistency with sufficiency (cs) is an indicator 
for the distinctiveness of a strategy for a particular framing. 
We will interpret cs-scores in “Discussion of Key Findings.”
The truth table analysis (TTA), which is a core procedure 
of QCA, produces a minimalized set of solutions that help 
understand the typical combinations of public governance 
strategies for each framing. This allows us to systematically 
investigate configurations of framings and public govern-
ance strategies. A simplified account of the underlying data 
can be found in “Appendix B.” We report results for each 
framing below.
Public Governance Strategies Associated with a ‘Societal 
Endangerment’ Framing
Cities that frame the sharing economy as a ‘societal endan-
germent’ typically apply, in their governance responses, one 
or more of the following combinations of public governance 
strategies:
(a) ‘regulation’ while explicitly not referring to ‘alignment’ 
or ‘provision’;
(b) ‘information’ while explicitly not referring to ‘partner-
ing’ or ‘provision’;
(c) ‘promotion’ in combination with ‘alignment’ while 
explicitly not referring to ‘expertise.’
Table 5 shows the detailed results of the TTA for ‘societal 
endangerment.’ The consistency score is an indicator for the 
accuracy of the predicted strategy combination; the coverage 
scores are indicators for its frequency. Cities often apply several 
strategy combinations simultaneously; the closer the unique 
3 We do not refer to necessary and sufficient conditions in form of a 
causal but contingency relationship.
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coverage is to the raw coverage, the more exclusive is the usage 
of a particular strategy combination. The last line of the table 
lists the cities in our sample that apply the focal combination. 
The first value in the brackets shows the set-membership score 
with the strategy combination, and the second value shows the 
set-membership score with the focal framing. 
Table 4  Analysis of necessity 
and sufficiency of focal public 
governance strategies
Consistency scores are calculated according to Ragin (2008)
cn consistency with necessity, cs consistency with sufficiency
Public governance 
strategy
Framing of the sharing economy as …
Societal endanger-
ment
Societal enhance-
ment
Market disruption Ecological 
transition
Factor 1 Inversion of factor 1 Factor 2 Inversion of 
factor 2
cn cs cn cs cs cs cn cs
Promotion
 Presence 0.65 0.44 0.81 0.65 0.71 0.57 0.64 0.44
 Absence 0.49 0.68 0.30 0.51 0.30 0.50 0.37 0.52
Regulation
 Presence 0.91 0.61 0.69 0.55 0.75 0.60 0.75 0.50
 Absence 0.33 0.47 0.51 0.87 0.37 0.64 0.40 0.57
Information
 Presence 0.63 0.52 0.65 0.64 0.53 0.52 0.75 0.61
 Absence 0.56 0.58 0.51 0.62 0.60 0.74 0.41 0.42
Alignment
 Presence 0.66 0.55 0.63 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.49 0.41
 Absence 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.66 0.41 0.49 0.60 0.60
Expertise
 Presence 0.60 0.51 0.63 0.63 0.58 0.58 0.67 0.57
 Absence 0.57 0.56 0.52 0.61 0.58 0.68 0.51 0.50
Technology
 Presence 0.56 0.52 0.65 0.71 0.50 0.55 0.75 0.69
 Absence 0.69 0.62 0.56 0.60 0.72 0.78 0.51 0.46
Partnering
 Presence 0.52 0.49 0.67 0.75 0.53 0.60 0.61 0.58
 Absence 0.74 0.65 0.59 0.57 0.63 0.66 0.57 0.50
Provision
 Presence 0.34 0.50 0.46 0.80 0.37 0.64 0.34 0.49
 Absence 0.86 0.57 0.71 0.56 0.70 0.56 0.76 0.50
Table 5  Truth table analysis for ‘societal endangerment’
Solution coverage: 0.86; solution consistency: 0.78 (Algorithm: Quine–McCluskey; parsimonious solution; consistency cutoff: 0.94)
~ signals the absence of a strategy; * logical AND (conjunction of strategies); + logical OR (substitutable/equifinal paths)
Typical public govern-
ance strategy combina-
tions
(a) 
regulation*
~alignment* ~ provision
+ (b) 
information*
~partnering* ~ provision
+ (c) 
promotion*alignment* 
~ expertise
Consistency 0.84 0.79 0.73
Raw coverage 0.47 0.52 0.32
Unique coverage 0.18 0.14 0.13
Cases with greater 
than 0.50 member-
ship in term
Chicago (1.00, 1.00)
Vancouver (0.80, 0.56)
Milan (0.60, 0.59)
Vienna (0.90, 0.77)
Chicago (0.80, 1.00)
Milan (0.80, 0.59)
Sydney (0.60, 0.66)
Amsterdam (1.00, 0.73)
Sydney (0.60, 0.66)
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Public Governance Strategies Associated with a ‘Societal 
Enhancement’ Framing
Cities that frame the sharing economy as a ‘societal 
enhancement’ typically apply one or more of the following 
combinations of public governance strategies:
(d) ‘provision’ in combination with ‘information’;
(e) the absence of ‘regulation’ in combination with the 
absence of ‘provision’;
(f) ‘expertise’ in combination with ‘promotion’ and ‘align-
ment.’
As the typical combinations in (d) and (e) are partly contra-
dictory, it is not likely that these two both appear together. The 
combinations in (d) and (f), as well as (e) and (f), are comple-
mentary and can therefore overlap. Table 6 shows the detailed 
results of the TTA for the ‘societal enhancement’ framing.
Public Governance Strategies Associated with a ‘Market 
Disruption’ Framing
Cities that frame the sharing economy as a ‘market disrup-
tion’ typically apply one or both of the following combina-
tions of public governance strategies:
(g) ‘regulation’ while not referring to ‘expertise’ or ‘provi-
sion’;
(h) ‘alignment’ while not referring to ‘information’ or ‘pro-
vision.’
Table 7 shows the detailed results of the TTA for the 
‘market disruption’ framing.
Public Governance Strategies Associated with an ‘Ecological 
Transition’ Framing
Cities that frame the sharing economy as an ‘ecological tran-
sition’ typically apply one or more of the following combina-
tions of public governance strategies:
(i) ‘information’ while not referring to ‘alignment’ or ‘pro-
vision’;
(j) ‘promotion’ in combination with ‘partnering’ while not 
referring to ‘information’ or ‘regulation’;
(k) ‘regulation’ in combination with ‘expertise’ while not 
referring to ‘partnering’ or ‘provision.’
Table 8 shows the detailed results of the TTA for the 
‘ecological transition’ framing.
Table 6  Truth table analysis for ‘societal enhancement’
Solution coverage: 0.79; solution consistency: 0.90 (Algorithm: Quine–McCluskey; parsimonious solution; consistency cutoff: 0.92)
~ signals the absence of a strategy; * logical AND (conjunction of strategies); + logical OR (substitutable/equifinal paths)
Typical public govern-
ance strategy combina-
tions
(d)
provision*information
+ (e)
~regulation* ~ provision
+ (f) 
expertise*
promotion*alignment
Consistency 0.98 0.91 0.89
Raw coverage 0.38 0.41 0.43
Unique coverage 0.12 0.18 0.11
Cases with greater than 
0.50 membership in 
term
New York City (0.80, 0.90)
Paris (0.60, 0.74)
Berlin (0.60, 0.73)
Barcelona (0.60, 0.99)
Copenhagen (1.00, 0.74)
London (0.80, 1.00)
Toronto (0.51, 0.42)
Paris (0.90, 0.74)
Berlin (0.80, 0.73)
Seoul (0.70, 0.73)
Toronto (0.60, 0.42)
Table 7  Truth table analysis for ‘market disruption’
Solution coverage: 0.50; solution consistency: 0.83 (Algorithm: Quine–McCluskey; parsimonious solution; consistency cutoff: 0.91)
~ signals the absence of a strategy; * logical AND (conjunction of strategies); + logical OR (substitutable/equifinal paths)
Typical public governance strat-
egy combinations
(g) 
regulation*
~expertise* ~ provision
+ (h) 
alignment*
~information* ~ provision
Consistency 0.86 0.83
Raw coverage 0.34 0.33
Unique coverage 0.16 0.16
Cases with greater than 0.50 
membership in term
Hong Kong (1.00, 1.00)
Sydney (0.60, 1.00)
London (0.60, 0.94)
Hong Kong (0.60, 1.00)
Toronto (0.60, 0.99)
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Discussion of Key Findings
The motivation for our research was of dual nature. First, we 
were interested in the spectrum of interpretations by urban 
policy- and strategy-makers with regard to the phenomenon 
of the sharing economy. Second, we intended to examine the 
interplay of their framings of opportunities and challenges 
and the governance responses they regard as adequate. In 
particular, we were interested in typical combinations of 
strategies and configurations of framings and governance 
strategies.
Four Ways of Making Sense of the Sharing Economy
We found four framings that are grouped in two pairs: ‘soci-
etal endangerment’ versus ‘societal enhancement,’ and ‘mar-
ket disruption’ versus ‘ecological transition.’ Our results are 
in line with prior research by Codagnone et al. (2016) but 
provide additional insights. In particular, we add the per-
spective of governing authorities.
Codagnone et al. (2016) label a first approach towards the 
sharing economy ‘regulated sustainability.’ Here, the sharing 
economy is re-embedded in the traditional economy through 
regulatory interventions. The equivalent framing in our 
study is ‘societal endangerment’ that is highly visible (fac-
tor score > 0.70) in the documents by Chicago (1.00 = total 
consistency), Vienna (0.77), Amsterdam (0.74), and Hong 
Kong (0.73). A second approach reported by Codagnone 
et al. (2016) is labeled the ‘great transformation’—a sharing 
movement that is guided by new values of consumption and 
the provision of public goods. In such a mindset, regulatory 
intervention seems not required. This is much in line with 
our ‘societal enhancement’ framing that is highly visible in 
the documents by London (1.00 = total consistency), Barce-
lona (0.99), New York City (0.90), Paris (0.74), Copenhagen 
(0.74), Berlin (0.73), and Seoul (0.73).
Codagnone et al. (2016) name two additional pathways: 
‘growth-oriented globalization’ and ‘barbarization.’ Both 
paths are characterized by minimal government intervention 
and rather uncontrolled market forces. These two partly over-
lap with our framing of ‘market disruption’ that is referred to 
by Amsterdam (1.00 = total consistency), Hong Kong (1.00), 
Toronto (0.99), Sydney (0.99), Barcelona (0.94), and Lon-
don (0.94). Our fourth framing of ‘ecological transition’ has 
no pendant in the study of Codagnone et al. (2016). It is 
referred to by Copenhagen (1.00), Paris (1.00), Los Angeles 
(0.99), and Chicago (0.78).
Overall, these varied approaches reveal the considerable 
ethical conundrum for strategy- and policy-makers when 
it comes to facing phenomena that have emerged with the 
rise of the sharing economy. The framing of the sharing 
economy as ‘market disruption’—which includes aspects of 
both opportunity and challenge—is in line with the work of 
various scholars and policy advisors who have highlighted 
innovation and the market catalyzing function of the shar-
ing economy due to disruptive technologies; in addition, 
increased social impact and benefit for consumers have 
been emphasized (e.g., Allen 2015). One fiercely debated 
question is whether an innovation- and market-friendly 
sharing economy approach is at odds with state regulation. 
Some scholars such as Koopman et al. (2015) emphasis the 
sharing economy’s self-regulatory power that alleviates the 
need for top-down regulation. Others, like Długosz (2014), 
distinguish between a general lack of regulation and regula-
tion that inhibits sharing. In addition, Ranchordás (2016) 
emphasizes that the timing of state intervention matters. Our 
empirical insights add yet another aspect: We argue that it is 
not merely about the presence or absence of regulation—but 
that one needs to probe deeper into which other governance 
instruments regulation is combined with in order to under-
stand the overall approach towards the sharing economy.
While there exists research on approaches and framings 
employed by sharing economy service providers and users 
(e.g., Gruszka 2017) as well as on the general discourse on 
the sharing economy (e.g., Martin 2016), we here examine 
the so far under-researched perspective of policy-makers and 
a specific focus on the urban level. We preliminary conclude 
that while issue framing might be different for each actor 
Table 8  Truth table analysis for ‘ecological transition’
Solution coverage: 0.68; solution consistency: 0.65 (Algorithm: Quine–McCluskey; parsimonious solution; consistency cutoff: 0.90)
~ signals the absence of a strategy; * logical AND (conjunction of strategies); + logical OR (substitutable/equifinal paths)
Typical public govern-
ance strategy combina-
tions
(i) 
information*
~alignment* ~ provision
+ (j) 
promotion*partnering*
~information* ~ regulation
+ (k) 
regulation*expertise*
~partnering* ~ provision
Consistency 0.75 0.69 0.66
Raw coverage 0.36 0.20 0.41
Unique coverage 0.11 0.11 0.17
Cases with greater than 
0.50 membership in 
term
Chicago (0.80, 0.78)
Milan (0.80, 0.64)
Vancouver (0.80, 0.65)
Los Angeles (0.60, 0.99) Vienna (1.00, 0.63)
Chicago (0.60, 0.78)
Milan (0.60, 0.64)
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group, for governing authorities it needs to be understood 
as a co-evolving process including the choice of suitable 
means of intervention (i.e., public governance strategies)—
with ample implications and consequences for other actors.
Patterned Governance Responses
Heterogeneity in the Combination of Public Governance 
Strategies
Our empirical results indicate that cities regularly refer to, 
and combine, a number of different public governance strate-
gies. In “Public Governance Strategies in Response to the 
Sharing Economy,” we analyzed the typical combinations 
of public governance strategies given a focal framing of 
the sharing economy. None of the governance strategies is 
associated with all framings, but some with multiple. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates the number of public governance strategies 
combined relative to the framings of the sharing economy.
Interestingly, but not unexpectedly, cities that draw on 
distinct framings seem to focus more and apply less variety 
in public governance strategies (see Fig. 2). In contrast, 
cities with a tendency to the factor crossing point seem to 
combine more public governance strategies—and also strate-
gies which seem to be drawing in different directions, such 
as regulation and promotion. This is much in line with the 
observations of Houle and Macdonald (2011) in the con-
text of climate change policy. The authors state that public 
spending (promotion) and instances of regulatory norms 
(regulation) are the most frequently used strategies and often 
intertwined—even though this may seem somewhat counter-
intuitive at first sight. In our case, ‘promotion’ and ‘regula-
tion’ are each applied by eleven cities, while eight cities 
apply both simultaneously (see “Appendix B”). The combi-
nation of these two strategies might refer to the “develop-
ment of [a] new industry” (Houle and Macdonald 2011, p. 
14) which requires both rule-setting and nurturing. In the 
case of the sharing economy, we can observe that cities try to 
enforce the adoption of traditional business norms (e.g., fair 
competition, payment of taxes) with regulative means, on the 
one hand, and to foster and cultivate innovation and specific 
business models (e.g., by providing support for start-ups, 
Fig. 2  Combination of many or 
few strategies by cities
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promoting certain organizations via official media channels), 
on the other.
Another explanation for the combination of multiple strat-
egies is that cities relying on more than one framing might 
be in need to balance conflicting expectations and demands 
from constituencies that have to be addressed with different 
means of governance. An example for such a case, within 
one sector of the sharing economy, is the regulation of com-
mercial actors (such as Uber) while partnering with non-
commercial actors (for instance, with private peer-to-peer 
car sharing initiatives). Meyer and Höllerer (2016) describe 
this as ‘intra-institutional’ complexity (as opposed to ‘inter-
institutional’) and emphasize ambiguity as way to deal with 
such complexity. In addition, heterogeneous responses can 
also origin from different subunits of the city administration 
being confronted with different demands from their environ-
ment (Binder 2007), such as the planning department of a 
city versus the tax office. Cities employing a non-comple-
mentary set of multiple framings (ending up close to the 
factor crossing point in our Figures) are more likely to build 
on the governance response of ‘expertise’ as a way of either 
justifying or resolving complexity.
Configurations of Framings and Public Governance 
Strategies
Heterogeneity and the combination of public governance 
strategies is one interesting insight from our data. An equally 
relevant insight concerns individual public governance strat-
egies (within the set of strategies a city applies) that appear 
in specific configurations with framings. We investigate this 
by contrasting the typical strategy combinations for ‘societal 
endangerment’ versus ‘societal enhancement’ as well as for 
‘market disruption’ versus ‘ecological transition’ (based on 
the truth table analyses, see “ Public Governance Strate-
gies in Response to the Sharing Economy”). Tables 9 and 
10 compare, line by line, the public governance strategies 
that are part of the typical strategy combinations of the 
respective framings. We were interested in the distinctive-
ness of certain strategies and used the consistency scores (as 
reported in Table 4) for our interpretation.
Nurture or  Restrict: ‘Provision’ Versus ‘Regulation’ Strate-
gies The comparison of governance strategies associated 
with a ‘societal endangerment’ framing in contrast to a 
‘societal enhancement’ framing is shown in Table  9. The 
strategies ‘alignment,’ ‘information,’ and ‘promotion’ are 
Table 9  Comparison of strategy 
combinations for ‘societal 
endangerment’ versus ‘societal 
enhancement’
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present in typical combinations of both framings; hence, 
their presence is not distinct for either of the two framings. 
For a framing of the sharing economy as ‘societal endan-
germent,’ ‘regulation,’ as a single governance strategy, is 
distinct. In contrast, ‘provision’ and ‘expertise’ are distinc-
tively associated with a framing of the sharing economy as 
‘societal enhancement.’
The argument that ‘regulation’ is distinct for the ‘societal 
endangerment’ framing is further supported by the analysis 
of consistency with sufficiency. ‘Regulation’ has a higher 
sufficiency score (cs = 0.61) for ‘societal endangerment’ 
than for the other three framings. For ‘societal enhance-
ment,’ a consistency with sufficiency analysis of ‘provi-
sion’ and ‘expertise’ indicates that both scores are higher 
than the respective scores in the other three framings. As 
provision has a much higher score (cs = 0.80) than expertise 
(cs = 0.63), we further propose that ‘provision’—as individ-
ual strategy—has the highest distinctiveness for this fram-
ing. Figure 3 places the cities in our sample with regard to 
the four framings and shows their usage of regulation’ and 
‘provision’ as governance strategies.
For the cases included in our study, this general choice 
between either nurturing and providing public sharing ser-
vices or restricting with laws and regulations reflects the 
way in which government defines its own role as either crea-
tor or regulator of the sharing economy. Clearly, such self-
definition of role and ‘role identity’ through strategy choice 
influences the ‘counter-roles’ of other actors (e.g., sharing 
economy organizations) and their possibilities to relate and 
interact (e.g., Jancsary et al. 2017).
Typical cases of cities with a restricting governance 
approach are Chicago and Vienna—both strongly draw on 
a ‘societal endangerment’ framing and apply a ‘regulation’ 
strategy. In contrast, New York City and Berlin strongly 
draw on a ‘societal enhancement’ framing and apply a ‘pro-
vision’ strategy. Specific accounts of why public authorities 
rely on the framing of ‘societal endangerment’ combined 
with ‘regulation’ strategies as well as ‘societal enhancement’ 
combined with ‘provision’ strategies are beyond our empiri-
cal study. Yet, several potential explanations seem plausi-
ble. First, the basic orientation of a city administration with 
regard to public service delivery can strongly influence its 
Fig. 3  ‘Provision’ versus ‘regu-
lation’ strategies
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position towards an issue. For instance, Barcelona—which 
exhibits a distinct provision strategy for the sharing econ-
omy—also makes efforts for a stronger re-municipalization 
of other public services (TNI 2017). Second, attempts at 
regulation require a focal government authority to have the 
political and legislative power to create and enforce new 
laws for the issue at hand. Third, institutional and cultural 
factors, among them different national or regional ‘adminis-
trative traditions’ (e.g., Knill 2001; Painter and Peters 2010; 
Meyer and Hammerschmid 2010; Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2011; Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014) as well as the specific 
administrative reform paradigms and governance regimes in 
place are expected to have substantial influence on framing 
and choice of governance strategy. Administrative traditions 
and reform agendas are based on the legal heritage and the 
conceptualization of government and citizenship which may 
vary remarkably from country to country—and sometimes 
even within.
Being Guided or  Guiding Others: ‘Alignment’ Versus ‘Infor-
mation’ Strategies The comparison of strategies associated 
with a ‘market disruption’ framing in contrast to the ‘eco-
logical transition’ framing is shown in Table 10. ‘Regula-
tion’ is present in typical combinations of both framings; 
hence, it is not distinct for either of the two. For a framing 
of the sharing economy as ‘market disruption,’ ‘alignment,’ 
as a single strategy, is distinct. In contrast, ‘information,’ 
‘promotion,’ ‘partnering,’ and ‘expertise’ are distinctively 
associated with the ‘ecological transition’ framing.
The argument that ‘alignment’ is distinct for the ‘market 
disruption’ framing is further supported by the analysis of 
consistency with sufficiency. Alignment has a higher suf-
ficiency score (cs = 0.67) for ‘market disruption’ than for 
the other three framings. For ‘ecological transition,’ further 
analysis indicates that ‘information’ has the highest suf-
ficiency (cs = 0.61) as well as necessity scores (cn = 0.75) 
among the four strategies. In addition, the scores are rec-
ognizably higher in the ‘ecological transition’ framing than 
in the opposing ‘market disruption’ framing. We therefore 
propose that ‘information’—as individual strategy—is the 
most distinct strategy associated with ‘ecological transition.’ 
Yet, all four strategies serve rather similar purposes as they 
indicate active engagement and foster intensified informa-
tion flow. Figure 4 places the cities in our sample with regard 
to the four framings and shows the usage of ‘alignment’ and 
‘information’ as governance strategies.
Table 10  Comparison of 
strategy combinations for 
‘market disruption’ versus 
‘ecological transition’
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Typical cases of cities that strongly draw on a ‘mar-
ket disruption’ framing and apply an ‘alignment’ strategy 
are Amsterdam and Sydney. Milan, Paris, and Vancouver 
strongly draw on an ‘ecological transition’ framing and 
apply an ‘information’ strategy.
We hold that the distinction between ‘alignment’ strate-
gies (such as the search for global formulas of success and 
identification of ‘role models’ in exchange with other gov-
erning authorities) and proactive ‘information’ strategies 
both reflect a perception of uncertainty regarding the issue—
on the side of government in the first instance, and on the 
side of stakeholders and the general public, in the second. 
In addition, ecological benefits (i.e., under the ecological 
transition framing) are probably easier to communicate to 
a public audience than complex and ambivalent economic 
effects (created by market disruption, often involving actors 
and market forces located beyond the area of influence of 
city governments).
Moral Judgement and Institutional Arrangements
The multifaceted nature of ‘sharing’ and the divergent set of 
rationales at play—together with often irreconcilable vested 
interests and power positions—fuel public policy debates 
and public governance challenges on the urban level. As 
Buchholz and Rosenthal (2004, p. 151; building on Pres-
ton and Post [1975]) state, the “public policy process is the 
means by which society as a whole articulates it goals and 
objectives, and directs and stimulates individuals and organi-
zations to contribute […] and cooperate.” However, gov-
ernment is not “just another stakeholder, […] it is far more 
than that because it is the major player in the public policy 
process” (Buchholz and Rosenthal 2004, p. 148): Govern-
ments have to choose (a set of) governance instruments, or 
tools, in order to steer society towards policy goals.
Our findings show that public governance strategies are 
intertwined with the framing of focal issues and phenomena, 
such as the notion of ‘sharing’ and the sharing economy 
more broadly. Consequently, issue framing has an effect on 
the choice of strategy and vice versa, but, ultimately, also 
Fig. 4  ‘Alignment’ versus 
‘information’ strategies
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on government itself as framing, self-positioning, and strat-
egy choice are inevitably connected. As with other complex 
policy processes, framing the sharing economy contains a 
moral judgement about what is good and what is bad. Ethical 
considerations of governments are reflected in their practices 
and choices as well as in deliberate acts of omission (Boston 
et al. 2010) and come to the fore in their strategic govern-
ance responses.
With a focal government defining its role, the roles of 
others, as well as the ‘rules of the game,’ it sets the playing 
field and the boundaries for all actors involved. The patterns 
we observe in the configuration of framings and governance 
strategies are indicative of field-level institutional arrange-
ments that also define, for instance, appropriate organiza-
tional forms and practices, or legitimate business models. 
For sharing economy organizations, these arrangements 
become a crucial part of their environment—one that they 
actively try to shape in their favor by corporate political 
activity (e.g., Hillman et al. 2004; Eberlein 2019) or explicit 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies (e.g., Matten 
and Moon 2008).
The Current State of Affairs: ‘Similarity Cum 
Variation’
We originally started this research endeavor with the 
assumption that the global debate and the increasing exist-
ence of position papers on the sharing economy is a sign 
for the worldwide spread of a global idea (e.g., Strang and 
Meyer 1994; Czarniawska and Sevón 1996; Drori et al. 
2006). However, our findings demonstrate that, at this point 
in time, cities vary considerably in their interpretation of 
the sharing economy as well as in their respective govern-
ance responses. Such heterogeneity could be due to the 
short duration of the global debate on the sharing economy, 
with no dominant theorization as of yet. In the long run, 
we expect that either isomorphic tendencies (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983) will lead to more homogeneity in issue fram-
ing and governance responses or that the sustained processes 
of glocalization will lead to only imperfect instantiations of 
the idea—that is, to ‘similarity cum variation’ (Drori et al. 
2014; Höllerer et al. 2017) including fragmented public 
policy debates and partial governance approaches.
Betting on the second prediction, we assume that the dif-
ferent framings of the sharing economy will continue to mir-
ror the different institutional environments in which local-
level governments are embedded. As McLaren and Agyeman 
(2015a, p. 84) state, “different cultures seem to place differ-
ent weight on competition and cooperation, and indeed more 
broadly on the concepts of individualism and collectivity” 
which influences the local receptivity of the idea of sharing 
and of the sharing economy more broadly. In this respect, for 
instance, it comes as little surprise that Vienna—embedded 
in the strong corporatist tradition of Austria and exposed to 
the continental European stakeholder governance model—
frames the sharing economy in reference to the objective of 
transforming the “share” to a “fair economy” by balancing 
the interest of all relevant stakeholders involved (Stadt Wien 
2016; Vith and Höllerer, in press); or that Sydney—influ-
enced by the Anglo-American administrative tradition and 
having undergone far-reaching deregulation and market-ori-
ented reforms in the public sector—states as its main goal 
“supporting a culture of innovation” for sharing economy 
organizations, explicitly referring to the creation of micro-
enterprises and self-employment (NSW Government 2015).
However, our findings also illustrate that the configura-
tion of framings and governance strategies brings together 
otherwise rather different, geographically and culturally dis-
connected cities: Amsterdam and Hong Kong have similar 
approaches towards the sharing economy; London and Bar-
celona; Seoul and Berlin; Paris and Copenhagen; as well as 
Vancouver and Milan. More research is needed to investigate 
whether additional contextual factors, such as demographic 
features of the population, size of administration, political 
orientation of government, or various socio-economic fea-
tures, can further explain these similarities and differences.
Contribution and Concluding Remarks
Our study aspired to record and understand the ways in 
which governing authorities interpret the sharing economy, 
deal with the political and ethical debates on the various 
social, economic, and moral issues related to the sharing 
economy, and link these interpretations to explicit public 
governance strategies. With our research, we make three 
major contributions. A first contribution is to the literature 
on the sharing economy. Our article is among the first to 
systematize the knowledge on perceived opportunities and 
challenges that are attributed to the sharing economy in 
a transnational context, as well as directly addressing the 
resulting governance responses. We draw attention to cities 
as central actors in the governance of important policy con-
cerns. Prior research on policy-making and business ethics 
focuses mostly on the national level and/or on the work of 
NGOs while cities have frequently slipped under the radar. 
By mapping the framings global cities draw upon, we pro-
vide a point of reference for future scholarly work as well as 
for policy-makers in order to assess and reflect their cities’ 
positioning.
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Second, we stress the central importance of the ethi-
cal and political dimension inherent in both the praxis of 
sharing as well as the governing of the sharing economy 
in a fair and responsible manner. In fact, the question of 
broader social impact and societal benefit—and, with this, of 
a ‘good’ sharing economy—depends much on the ascribed 
opportunities and challenges. Cities directly and indirectly 
apply ethical considerations and moral judgement in their 
interpretations of opportunities and challenges that come 
with the sharing economy. These judgements are intertwined 
with their governance responses and strategies, and together 
create the institutional arrangements that enable and delimit 
agency of other actors. We hold that a number of core ethical 
questions regarding the sharing economy therefore need to 
be addressed taking this institutional setting seriously. Our 
study provides an example of the importance of the urban 
governance level, where many decisions are made that affect 
the everyday lives of people as well as the economic frame-
work for local market structures and participants.
Third, and going beyond the confines of the phenomenon 
of the sharing economy, our work contributes to a better 
understanding of public governance strategies by proposing 
a more generic framework of how distinct public governance 
strategies co-occur with specific interpretations of issues. 
This adds to the picture painted by, for instance, Bemelmans-
Videc et al. (1997) and theorizes the set of policy instru-
ments in relation to the framing of a focal issue. We call 
for future research on other policy debates in order to cor-
roborate our conceptual findings and to jointly develop a 
more applicable framework for policy-related governance 
strategies and instruments that are able to engage with mor-
ally complex issues.
As with any empirical study, ours is not without limita-
tions. Boundary conditions, for instance, are positive selec-
tion (i.e., only those cities that are proactive in addressing 
the sharing economy) and an unintended bias towards the 
Global North. Even though we tried to include all cities in 
the sample that were in the A. T. Kearney Global Cities top-
25-ranking and published a strategy paper, we might have 
overlooked documents due to language barriers. This seems 
unfortunate as the comparison across different cultural set-
tings would be particularly interesting. Another limitation 
is our empirical disregard of institutional factors that might 
influence the framings of and strategic governance responses 
towards the sharing economy (such as law and administra-
tive tradition, level of municipal autonomy as well as other 
dimensions of organizational and administrative design, 
political and ideological history, socio-economic factors). 
Our findings are further based on discursive material that 
could be substantiated by investigating actual governance 
practice within the various empirical settings. In addition, 
our sampling of documents mirrors the heterogeneity in the 
terms that are associated with sharing—e.g., sustainability, 
collaboration, circularity. Clearly, the choice of label is not 
coincidental and may already cue a particular framing. Inter-
estingly, a very recent “Sharing Cities Declaration” (Sharing 
Cities Summit 2018), signed by 31 cities (7 of them in our 
sample), concurs on ‘platform economy,’ a label that plays 
little role in the cities’ strategy documents.
Future research could also assess the medium-term 
impact of public governance strategies on the further devel-
opment of the sharing economy. Eventually, such research 
on the real-life effects of governance instruments could con-
tribute to the formulation of practical governance implica-
tions. Finally, assessing the position of city governments 
towards the sharing economy in general, we disregarded 
any particular positions towards specific companies usu-
ally associated with the sharing economy (such as Airbnb 
and Uber)—which might contrast their overall take on the 
issue. Although we acknowledge that position papers only 
represent a snapshot while governments have ongoing policy 
discussions that may alter their framings and governance 
responses, we could not include dynamics over time.
In closing, it is our hope that our work here is seen as 
complementary to other studies that focus more on the 
micro-level phenomena of sharing and sharing economy 
organizations. Considering the political and ethical debates 
on the various social, economic, and moral issues related 
to the sharing economy, our article contributes to a better 
and in-depth understanding of the field-level institutional 
arrangements that is prerequisite for the examination of 
moral behavior, social responsibility, and societal account-
ability of sharing economy organizations on the micro-level.
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Appendix A: Set coincidence analysis of strategies
Appendix B: Factor scores and occurrence of strategies per city
Cities Factor scores: Framing of the sharing 
economy as…
Public governance strategies
Societal 
endanger-
ment
Societal 
enhance-
ment
Market 
disrup-
tion
Eco-
logical 
transi-
tion
Promo-
tion
Regu-
lation
Informa-
tion
Align-
ment
Expertise Tech-
nology
Partner-
ing
Provi-
sion
London 0.00 1.00 0.94 0.06 ○ ○ ○ ● ● ○ ○ ○
Barcelona 0.01 0.99 0.94 0.06 ● ○ ● ○ ○ ○ ● ●
New York 
City
0.10 0.90 0.50 0.50 ● ● ● ○ ○ ● ○ ●
Paris 0.26 0.74 0.00 1.00 ● ● ● ● ● ● ○ ●
Copenha-
gen
0.26 0.74 0.00 1.00 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ● ● ○
Berlin 0.27 0.73 0.51 0.49 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
Seoul 0.27 0.73 0.51 0.49 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ○
Los Ange-
les
0.51 0.49 0.01 0.99 ● ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ● ●
Vancouver 0.56 0.44 0.35 0.65 ● ● ● ○ ● ● ● ○
Toronto 0.58 0.42 0.99 0.01 ● ○ ○ ● ● ○ ○ ○
Milan 0.59 0.41 0.36 0.64 ● ● ● ○ ● ● ○ ○
Sydney 0.66 0.34 0.99 0.01 ● ● ● ● ○ ● ○ ○
Hong 
Kong
0.73 0.27 1.00 0.00 ○ ● ○ ● ○ ○ ○ ○
Amsterdam 0.74 0.26 1.00 0.00 ● ● ○ ● ○ ○ ● ●
Vienna 0.77 0.23 0.37 0.63 ○ ● ● ● ● ○ ○ ○
Chicago 1.00 0.00 0.22 0.78 ○ ● ● ○ ● ● ○ ○
The displayed factor scores are based on the factor analysis and reveal to what extent a city is relying on the two factors that are described in 
detail in the section “Empirical Results.” The scores are re-calibrated as fuzzy-sets in order to be used for the f-s QCA. As part of the re-calibra-
tion, the minimum value was set as 0.00, the maximum value was set as 1.00, and the mean value as 0.50. All city scores were then re-assigned 
while retaining the relative distances in the primary positive (> 0.50) and in the primary negative array (< 0.50)
The occurrence (set-membership value 0.51 to 1.00; symbolized by ●) or non-occurrence (set-membership value 0.00 to 0.50; symbolized 
by ○) of a strategy displays in a simplified way whether a city applies a strategy or not
Promotion Regulation Information Alignment Expertise Technology Partnering Provision
Promotion
Regulation 0.57
Information 0.55 0.64
Alignment 0.52 0.58 0.38
Expertise 0.48 0.58 0.58 0.45
Technology 0.50 0.53 0.54 0.38 0.53
Partnering 0.58 0.39 0.36 0.43 0.39 0.44
Provision 0.46 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.21 0.28 0.49
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